Re: [OPE-L] rosa luxemburg

From: Rakesh Bhandari (bhandari@BERKELEY.EDU)
Date: Thu Mar 29 2007 - 11:35:39 EDT

>Hi Ope list memebers,
>as promissed some time ago please find attach my 
>paper on Rosa Luxemburg. It is mostly a 
>translation of an early German version with some 
><>Kostenlos: AOL eMail
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>Sichern Sie sich Ihre persönliche eMail Adresse noch heute!
>Attachment converted: Macintosh HD:rosa 
>luxemburg confe#21CAD7.DOC (WDBN/MSWD) (0021CAD7)

Hi Dogan,
Just reading your most interesting paper. 
Questions already coming to mind especially in 
light of the excellent (yet controversial) paper 
on Marx and Hegel I just read in the latest 
Science and Society by Sean Sayers (his work on 
contradiction is also of enduring significance).
A couple of quick questions:

1. How does Luxemburg understand Marx's critique 
of the Hegelian dialectic--its idealism (which 
Grossman, Chris Arthur and Tony Smith all see as 
mirroring both the delusions and rapacity of 
'self-expanding' value), its delusive resolution 
of contradiction (e.g. universality or 
bureaucracy resolves contradiction between 
particularity or people and monarchy or 
generality), its insistence on identity rather 
than unity of opposites (Godelier insists on 

2. What do you (and did RL) make of not the 
epistemological nihilist or ethical neo 
Kantianism but the social scientific neo 
Kantianism of Max Adler? Kant did in a limited 
way break out of atomistic ontology at least in 
Adler's reader. This shared aspect of classical 
German philosophy was important for Marx.
Here's an example:

Marx believed "that the content of every 
individual consciousness was necessarily 
socialized; language itself, in which that 
content is expressed, is of course a social 
inheritance. Kant's theory supplies this idea 
with an epistemological basis. There is a 
profound analogy between
Kant's refutation of the apparent substantiality 
of the self, and Marx's critique of commodity 
fetishism and reject of the 'reified' appearances 
of social phenomena. The life of a society is nto 
secondary to that of the
individuals composing it, but is a network of 
relationships comprehending those individuals. 
Man is a social being in his very essence, and 
not simply because he associates with others for 
reasons of instinct or calculation. Just as, in 
Marx's analysis, the apparent objectivity of 
commodities resolves itself into social 
relations, so the appearances of
personal consciousness resolve themselves into a 
general consciousness (das Bewusstein uberhaupt) 
linking individuals with one another. Whether we 
know it or not, in communication with others we 
relate our thought to
transcedental consciousness. A reality which 
cannot be directly perceived, but is accessible 
to critical analysis  is manifested in the 
relations between human beings, just as value is 
manifested in exchange value." P. 263-4 of Main
Currents of Marxism, vol II.

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