[OPE-L:4750] real wages & wage differentials

Gerald Lev (glevy@pratt.edu)
Sat, 12 Apr 1997 17:49:27 -0700 (PDT)

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In what follows, I will take-up Patrick's suggestion that we discuss more
concretely real wages and wage differentials. The logical division that I
have chosen to discuss this subject is as follows:


I. Capital
II. Landed-Property
III. Wage-Labour
IV. The State
V. International Trade
VI. World Market and Crisis


I. Capital

a) if one accepts the proposition that labour-power is a (very, very, very
special, i.e. unique!) commodity and that commodities _in general_ sell
at their value, then wages on average will equal the value of the
commodity labour-power. Yet, if this is the case on average, it
necessarily follows that some workers will receive a wage in excess of
the value of labour-power while other workers will receive a wage below
the value of labour-power. This, however, does not tell us *why* there
are these wage differentials.

b) the value of labour-power, it is anticipated, is determined by the
costs to produce *and reproduce* laborers. This means that wages reflect
not only the needs of the laborers themselves but also the
*reproduction requirements*, i.e. the costs associated with sustaining
and nurturing non-wage earners in working-class *families*. Yet
these costs change historically and culturally. Also the very meaning
of the "working-class family" and who in that family is a wage-earner
also changes. Consequently, the amount of money required for
reproduction/wage-earner also changes over time (this subject will be
developed more later).

c) the wage is not equal to the subsistence requirements of wage-earners.
Rather, there is an excess over subsistence requirements that include
a "cultural and moral" component. Yet, what determines this "cultural
and moral" component? We will discuss that underdeveloped topic later.

d) one source of wage differentials are differences in skill levels among
workers. Since workers with more skills can command a higher than
average wage in the market, there is an incentive for capitalists to
"deskill" workers through the creation of "abstract labor". Yet, the
complexity of the production process and the current state of
technology often requires that they hire a certain percentage of
skilled workers (even where the percentage of skilled to unskilled
workers decreases). Workers obtain these skills through training and
education, e.g. apprenticeships, college courses, etc.. Obviously, the
anticipated returns for obtaining a skill outweigh, in general, the
costs of training (otherwise, workers would have little incentive to
obtain these skills). Yet, the wages for specific types of skilled
labor are related to the demand for that type skilled labor. Thus,
skilled workers can find to their dismay that their skills are no
longer required by capital (at all or to the same degree) by the
"obsolescence" of skills. Obsolescence of skills may be due to changes
in the production process, e.g. when new process technologies "deskill"
workers, or to changes in the type of commodities produced, e.g. when
changes in product technologies render certain skills obsolete (thus,
the once highly-skilled occupation of "harpooner" was rendered obsolete
when the whaling industry itself became obsolete). While the bargaining
power of skilled workers would in general be greater than the
bargaining power of unskilled (or semi-skilled) workers, the wages for
particular types of skilled workers varies to a great extent depending
on the relation of the demand for particular types of skilled
labour-power to the supply of that labour-power. Thus, there could be
certain skills for which there is an excess demand causing their wages
to increase (e.g. nurses in many regions). On the other hand, there may
be an "excess supply" of workers with certain skills (e.g. robotic
technicians in Michigan) leading to a decrease in wages. Other factors
related to wage differentials for skilled workers will be considered

e) As suggested above, the demand for labour-power is also a variable that
will affect wages and wage differentials. Of course, we would
anticipate that the demand for labour-power will vary during different
phases of the trade cycle. Obviously, when the demand for labour-power
is high workers have a greater ability to obtain wage increases than
when the demand for labour-power weakens. Yet, capital exists not in
one place but in many. Consequently, we will have to consider how the
demand for labour-power varies in different regions and internationally

f) the industrial reserve army (related to above). As the IRA increases,
there is increased "competition" for jobs by workers and a downward
pressure on wages, and vice versa. While it could be argued that an
IRA > 0 is required to maintain capitalist profitability, we would
expect the size of the IRA to vary alongside changes in the rate of
accumulation and the trade cycle and, therefore, the pressure on wages
would vary accordingly. Alongside the concentration and centralization
of capital, the supply of labor would tend to increase as more and more
segments of other classes are proletarianized directly or join the IRA.
Yet, the ability of capital to "absorb" these workers would itself
depend in large part on the rate of accumulation and the production of
relative surplus value. Of course, other factors such as the production
of absolute surplus value and the intensity of work would also affect
the size of the IRA. But, the ability of capital to increase absolute s
and the intensity of labor has "social" (as well as "natural") limits
that we will consider later.

g) Without specifying the determinants of *inflation* at this time, it is
clear that a general rise in the average price of commodities will
decrease workers real income, ceteris paribus. The burden of inflation,
though, may fall disproportionately on certain segments of workers
whose nominal wages have not kept apace of the increase in inflation.
This may vary by region and internationally as well as among different
segments of the working-class (more later). To the extent that the
burden of inflation falls disproportionately on the working-class, it
gives rise to increasing demands for wage increases (more later). Yet,
to the extent that wages have been increasing, these nominal wage
increases, often accompanying the expansionary phase of the trade cycle
as the demand for labour-power increases, can also *contribute* to
increased inflation. When inflation (or unemployment) are increasing,
the state often intervenes to "control" inflation (or unemployment).
*How* the state can intervene and affect workers real wages will be
discussed later.


II. Landed-Property

a) as a class, land-owners (like other classes) are not "simple unity" or
"difference" alone, but rather "unity-in-difference." Thus, they have
certain class interests against capitalists and workers, have internal
differences and divisions, and this tension is mediated through
unity-in(with) difference.

b) as simple unity, landowners attempt to maximize rents. Yet, landowners
are divided on the basis of what land they own and which class they
relate to and derive income from. Thus,

1) landowners who rent land, houses, or apartments to working-class
families can increase their income at the expense of the
working-class by raising rents and, thereby, decreasing workers'
real wages. Of course, their ability to raise rents depends
crucially on the supply of land and housing stock in communities
where working-class families reside (in relation to the demand for
that housing by working-class families). To a large extent,
landowners would either benefit from or be hurt by the locational
decisions of capitalists in the sense that the demand for labor in
a region would have a significant impact on the demand by workers
for housing in that area. It could be argued that if real wages
decrease as a result of increasing rents, then capitalists would be
under increased pressure to increase wages. But, there is nothing
automatic about that possibility and the cost of housing varies very
significantly in different communities, regions and internationally.

2) where landowners, such as farmers, sell commodities destined to be
primarily means of consumption for workers, if they increase the
price of the commodities that they sell, that will decrease real
wages, ceteris paribus. The ability of landowners to have this
affect would require the lack of ability of wage-earners to produce
these goods themselves for personal consumption (e.g. the lack of
land ownership by working-class families for subsistence farming)
and would be enhanced by the lack of competitive structure _among_
landowners selling these means of consumption to workers. For
example, if the landowners who produce corn formed a cartel in an
attempt to keep corn prices high, this would be more likely to bring
about the result of increasing corn prices and decreasing real wages
(assuming that workers consume corn). In that case, the
*solidarity* of cartel members, and the lack of available substitute
means of consumption for workers, would crucially affect their
ability to raise corn prices. Yet, in many cases, workers can select
substitutes produced by other landowners. Thus, the class interests
of landowners would be divided based on what they produce and the
competitive structure of the market.

c) the process of capitalist centralization and concentration (referred to
above) that accompanies accumulation and the poverty of small
agricultural producers would tend to decrease the size of the
landowning class and increase proletarianization (including the
creation of an agricultural proletariat). Over time, we would
anticipate that this will result in increasing concentration _in_
agriculture and the creation of large agricultural combines, such as
"agrobusiness", which would have a greater monopoly of land ownership
and would employ wage-laborers (agricultural proletarians). On the one
hand, technical change and increasing productivity in agriculture
creates the possibility of decreasing prices for means of consumption
purchased by workers and hence *rising* real wages. On the other hand,
the oligopolistic structure of markets would allow these landowning
corporations to increase prices for these commodities and, thereby,
lead to *decreasing* real wages. To the extent that there are regional
(or international) differences in the prices of these commodities,
this process could account to *some* degree for wage differentials.

d) Alongside concentration and centralization in agriculture, the constant
capital required for landowners to remain competitive grows. This
frequently means that they must borrow funds for investment in c and
expand the scale of output to pay back the loans. What this means, in
part, is that "landowners" such as fishing operations are driven to
increase the "harvest" by "over-exploiting" nature. This, then, can
lead to severe environmental consequences (including the extinction of
species of fish) and, ultimately, a diminishing "harvest". As the
supply decreases, this then bids up the price. If the commodities form
a major part of the stapel of working-class families, they will then be
forced into paying higher prices or, if possible, purchasing substitute
goods. It is possible that workers could form consumer cooperatives to
deal with this problem of rising prices for consumer goods, but that
relates more to the next subject ....


III. Wage-Labour

a) As we saw previously in Ic., the wage has a "moral and cultural"
component in excess of physical subsistence requirements. This refers
to a bundle of goods that are *socially-understood* as "necessary."
Yet, what determines the "needs" of workers and how does this change
over time?

b) Working-class "needs" are both shaped by capitalist production *and* by
workers themselves. That is: 1) in the course of capitalist production
new commodities are produced by capitalists for sale to
consumers, including workers. Once we take into consideration firm
advertising and marketing, which accompanies concentration and product
differentiation, we see how firms are able to *create* a want and
"need" for these commodities among workers; and 2) whereas capitalists
can help to create these "wants" and "needs" for consumer goods, workers
require the "ability" (i.e. money income) to obtain those goods on the
market to satisfy their needs. Yet, while it is in the interests of the
individual capitalists who produce those commodities for workers to
have a demand for their commodities, it is not necessarily in the class
interests of capitalists as a whole to increase wages such that workers
can afford these commodities; yet 3) workers themselves come to
believe that they need these commodities, i.e. they redefine their own
needs, and demand increasing wages. If workers are successful in
*struggling* for wage increases such that their new needs are
satisfied, then the general standard of the "cultural and moral"
component of the wage increases. Thus, while individual capitalists
help to create these needs (even where they attempt initially to
produce "luxury goods" for consumption by capitalists), the expansion
of mass production of these commodities and the *subjectivity* and
*self-activity* workers themselves help to establish a new social
definition of working-class "needs." Of course, how workers understand
"needs" varies culturally and internationally (more later).

c) Workers come to realize that *collective organization* is required to
confront the collective organization of capital. That is, they come to
understand that they have strength when organized collectively that
they wouldn't have as individual workers. Hence, they come to realize
the importance of *trade unions* for bargaining with individual
capitalists over wages and the conditions of employment. Consequently,
the factors that make for successful trade union organization --
*solidarity* and *militancy* -- are variables that affect wage levels.
Yet, since not all workers are organized in trade unions and since the
level of solidarity and militancy varies among trade unions, we would
expect wage differentials both among unionized vs. non-unionized
workers and among different unions and locations. This, as well, varies
culturally and internationally (more later).

In bargaining with trade unions, capitalists frequently cease
(temporarily) being a "band of hostile brothers" and unite for the
purpose of resisting wage and benefit demands. In that sense, they
confront labour as unity since they realize that increasing wages for
workers in one firm will cause unions to attempt to generalize wage
increase elsewhere.
Yet ...

d) Wage-earners, like other classes, are not simple unity, but are a class
divided. On the simplest possible level, divisions within the
working-class are exploited by capitalists to weaken the bargaining
power of workers and unions and drive down wages and benefits as well
as assisting capital in their efforts to increase the intensity of
work, absolute s, and relative s. Yet, large segments of the
working-class often support the maintenance of these divisions and may,
indeed, benefit in the short-run by the persistence of these divisions.

e) As we discussed previously in Ib, the wage includes the reproduction
costs of the working-class family. These costs, and the social
understanding of family needs, change over time. For instance,
increasing medical costs can decrease workers' real wages. On the other
hand, working-class families through their self-activity can change the
"cultural and moral" understanding of needs as they demand increasing
quantities and qualities of goods to support family needs. Thus,
depending on the "culture", working-class families may come to believe
that they need disposable diapers and child care for children. Clearly
the socially-understood costs of childrearing have increased
dramatically this century -- as any parent knows. Bearing these costs
in mind, some workers might avoid getting married and/or having
children. Yet, workers also have a *subjectivity* in which the desire
for companionship and children has to be taken into account. That is,
workers frequently knowingly decide to get married and/or have children
with the understanding that there are costs (and sacrifices) associated
with these activities because they are motivated by something *more
than* self-interest narrowly-understood. In this sense, they identify
*themselves* as *more than* wage-earners, i.e. as *human beings* whose
needs can not be completely satisfied in isolation.

f) Pre-dating capitalism, there was the emergence of *patriarchy* and a
division of labor based on *gender*. This division of labor in industry
and in the home has persisted under capitalism. One might argue that
such discrimination against women is structurally necessary for the
reproduction of capitalist social relations. Yet, the role of women
within the working class has undergone a number of changes that vary
culturally and internationally. Thus, women became wage-earners in the
textile mills during the Industrial Revolution and, quite commonly,
during war-time. When the rate of unemployment grows (and/or when wars
end) however, there is pressure by both capitalists *and* male workers
for women to resume their "traditional" roles in the family.
(Relatedly, there are periods in which "children" are brought into and
then expelled from the labor force. Yet, the social understanding of
who are "children" changes historically and varies culturally and
internationally). Yet, women also have *subjectivity* and desire social
and economic equality. This, then, can lead to conflicts within the
working-class as women attempt to obtain employment outside of the
home and/or in "non-traditional" jobs for women. This desire for
"non-traditional" jobs is, in part, motivated, by the pattern of hiring
by capital whereby women have historically been segregated into
lower-paid jobs, frequently in the "service sector", that have been
understood as "women's work." As can be expected, this change
frequently meets hostility and resistance both within the family from
husbands and other male members of the family and among the male
workers (or co-workers) who already have the jobs that have been
understood as "men's work." Yet, through their collective organization,
women can succeed to some degree in changing the cultural
understandings of gender and employment and can even win the support of
some male workers and workers' organizations. We have seen a rather
dramatic change in this regard in many cultures since the emergence of
the modern women's movement in the 1970's. However, in other
cultures, there has been less change and greater resistance.

g) *One* of the factors contributing to the increased presence of women
workers and their entry into "non-traditional" jobs has been declining
real wages in the face of inflation, increasing costs for childrearing,
housing, education, etc. In other words, many working-class families
come to realize that they can not currently satisfy their material
needs if only one member (traditionally, the husband) has a job for
wages. Thus, we see the eroding of the traditional "housewife" role
(yet, women, often find to their dismay that their male partners expect
them to have jobs *and* still perform the traditional women's roles in
the household -- another source of tension in many working-class
families). This change does have *some* benefits for capitalists *if*
it results in lower wages (as the supply of exploitable labour-power
increases) and if the reproduction costs/worker go down as a

h) Workers are also divided by *race*, *nationality* and *ethnicity*.
While it can be argued that capital created and benefits by these
divisions (for an analysis of *why* there are these division, we would
have to consider, among other subjects, the history and meaning of the
persistence of slavery under capitalism, colonialism, nationalism, and
imperialism) there can be no doubt that the relatively "privaleged"
(non-discriminated) workers have frequently supported and helped to
maintain this discrimination. This discrimination frequently takes the
form of differential wages and benefits, different unemployment
experiences, and segregation into lower-paid jobs (here the subject of
"segmented labor markets" should be discussed). Yet, as we saw above,
the discriminated group can through their own organization and
self-activity demand, and sometimes succeed in winning, changes. But,
as can be expected, there is frequently resistance by white privaleged
workers to these changes -- although, the movement by discriminated
groups often leads to a change in social understandings and less
resistance by these workers to change. In a period where there is a
high unemployment rate, there is frequently greater resistance to this
change (relatedly, there is also greater scapegoating of undocumented
workers and calls for "immigration controls"). There are also divisions
*among* these groups (thus, even within the "African-American
community" there are internal divisions based on skin color,
nationality, language, etc.). Some of these divisions have a long
history going back to colonialism. In any event, these divisions serve
to divide these workers and make it more difficult to obtain their
goals (because "in unity there is strength"). The role of other social
institutions (religious, educational, media, etc) would also have to be
understood to explain this process more concretely.

i) As discussed in Id, there are also wage differentials based on skill.
More concretely, skilled and unskilled workers are frequently divided
in terms of trade union representation into "craft" and "industrial"
unions. To the extent that craft unionism allows mgt. to divide workers
and play-off one union against others, it helps to drive down wages --
although *some* workers and unions may benefit in the short-run by this

j) relatedly, there are certain groups of workers who consider themselves
to be "professionals" rather than workers as such (e.g. college
instructors ....). If they view themselves as "professionals" with a
commonality of interest with their employers, then it makes it very
difficult to build an effective trade union organization which can
confront employers. The system of "ranks" within these professions
(e.g. Instructor, Associate Professor, Assistant Professor, Professor)
also leads to wage differentials and a weakening of solidarity --
especially since the "professionals" sometimes take part in
"evaluating" other professionals (a traditional management function).
This attitude towards other "professionals" is often even more
pronounced when one observes the attitudes of the "professionals" to
other workers at the same job site.

k) of increasing importance in many capitalist nations, we see the growth
of part-time and temporary workers with lower wages, little or no
benefits, frequently lack of trade union representation and
contractual rights, etc. Very frequently a disproportionately high
percentage of these part-time workers are women and minorities.

l) Immigrant workers frequently experience discrimination (although, this
frequently varies very significantly based on race and country of
origin). A somewhat separate category is undocumented workers. In their
case, they are particularly vulnerable to lower wages, no benefits, no
legal protection, etc. Due to their "illegal" status, capitalists are
able to more easily resist trade union organization, increase the
intensity of work, increase absolute s, and offer lower wages since
these workers know that it frequently takes only a telephone call to
the immigration authorities to have them arrested and then deported.
Capitalists in some branches of production have come to rely heavily
on this type of labor.

m) another source of wage differentials, very frequently, is the
*seniority system*. While this system was originally sought by trade
unions to prevent retaliation against union activists, the creation of
a wage system tied to seniority leads to wage inequalities (and
sometimes tensions among workers) within the firm. While the "last
hired, first fired" system may make sense to many workers, it can also
be a _de facto_ way in which women and minorities who more recently
obtained employment can lose their jobs.

n) the ability of a union to successfully bargain for increased wages (as
discussed above) depends on solidarity and militancy. However, in
addition to overcoming the above divisions, there is
all-too-frequently a significant divide between the "ranks" and the
"leadership". One aspect of this divide relates to the material
benefits (higher income, benefits, substantial perks, etc.) of the
"leaders" who frequently live a very different lifestyle from the
ranks. The careerism of many of these "leaders" leads them sometimes
to prioritise _their_ interests rather than the interests of the
membership. "Business unionism" and "labor-management cooperation"
are often the forms of unionism pursued by these [class
collaborationist] "leaders". In the post-WW2 period, many of these
"leaders" agreed to a "labor accord" whereby there would be wage
increases with productivity increases in exchange for accepting
"management prerogatives." What many workers have increasingly come
to realize is that the struggle for higher wages and benefits etc.
requires that they re-take control over their own unions from this
parasitic clique.

o) For the working-class as a whole to overcome these divisions, class
solidarity is required. This requires that they increasingly view
themselves _as workers_. Yet, it also requires that they identify with
the demands of discriminated groups in their own class (rather than
simple unity, what is required is unity-in-diversity) and re-take
control over their own organizations (e.g. trade union democracy is
required in order for trade unions to once again become effective
fighting instruments). Beyond that, it requires that they increasingly
engage in *international* solidarity and see themselves as part of the
international working-class in opposition to capital and for
themselves (more later).


IV. The State

a) To the extent that the state is an "instrument of the ruling class",
the state can utilize repression to prevent or end strikes, arrest
militants, etc. This would exert both a downward pressure on wages
and, to the extent that these actions were directed against one segment
of the working class, state policies could increase wage
differentials by branch of production or region. The state can also
attempt to impose "wage controls" (a cap or a freeze) on workers as
well -- all in the name of the "public interest" or "national
security", of course.

b) price supports for farmers would tend to decrease the supply of food
and drive up their prices => decreasing real wages.

c) The state establishes and modifies a legal system in which workers
and capitalists must comply. As noted above, the state can outlaw
strikes and unions. *Or*, the state, under public pressure, can
establish laws giving workers the right to collective bargaining as
well as other rights. The state can also pass laws against
discrimination (or maintain laws perpetuating discrimination). All of
these actions can have an impact on real wages and wage differentials.

d) The state can pass minimum wage legislation, and/or create welfare,
unemployment compensation, food stamps, national health insurance,
etc. This can be expected to change real wages and have an impact on
wage differentials.

e) The state can provide certain goods as public goods that were
previously only available as commodities for sale on the marketplace.
Relatedly, they can license public utilities (e.g. gas, electricity)
and contain price increases. Again, this impacts real wages. To the
extent that workers in different regions have a differential access to
these benefits, it can have an impact on real wage differentials.

f) Other state programs, which together might be thought as being part of
the "social wage" include:

-- public education. This might be seen as also being in the
collective interests of capital to the extent that certain skills
that are desirable from a capitalist perspective (e.g. learning to
obey orders, not be tardy, literacy). Yet, it also represents a
concession to working-class families. Public colleges (including
technical colleges) are also a place where (some) future workers
learn skills. In that sense, part of the cost of learning a skill
can be borne by the state. On the other hand, as more and more
workers obtain high school diplomas and college degrees the market
value of those degrees diminish. Moreover, unless explicitly
provided for, there is no mechanism to assure that these individuals
with skills obtain skilled jobs.

-- public housing and rent controls => increasing real wages. Since
not all working-class families would benefit, this can also have an
impact on real wage differentials.

-- mass transportation in urban areas reduce the cost/person for
transportation and thus increase real wages. Those workers, on the
other hand, who due to their location have to rely on private
transport will be at a relative disadvantage.

g) public sector employment => decreased unemployment, increasing wages.

h) the state can pursue macro monetary and fiscal policies to combat
unemployment and/or inflation. Yet, these policies may affect
different segments of the working-class differently.

i) the state can implement industrial policy and/or give subsidies to
existing firms. This would change unemployment and wages in different
regions and branches of production.

j) There is always a tension between the state pursuing the collective
interests of capital and it serving the "public interest" in civil
society. Most workers view the state as _their_ state (since they are
imbued with nationalism). Yet, when the state is viewed as acting too
one-sidedly on behalf of capital a "legitimation crisis" can occur.
During expansionary periods it is easier for the state to make
concessions to workers. On the other hand, during times of economic
crisis we frequently see the state introduce austerity measures which
can then lead to social conflicts. One dynamic worth noting is that
when workers have won a concession from capital or the state they come to
view it as their _right_ and they are frequently not willing to give-up
what they now view as their rights. Thus, austerity policies can also
lead to a "legitimation crisis".


V. International Trade

[Here I'm going to begin to be more sketchy since I'm getting exhausted
writing this long post]

a) The international division of labor and specialization affects workers
wages in different countries.

b) differences in commodity prices for means of consumption affect real

c) there are, of course, international differences in wages which can
have an impact on commodity prices and real wages in the country that
commodities are exported to.

d) international trade has different impacts on regions _within_ a
country in the sense that it can contribute to growth or decline in
the regional IRA and, thereby, wages.

e) the state can intervene (or not intervene) on behalf of individual
domestic firms and branches of production. This then can affect
profitability in those firms or markets, unemployment regionally,
and wages. Yet, if they practice protectionism, their trading partner
could retaliate hurting some capitalists and workers in their own
countries -- but probably _not the same_ capitalists or workers who had
previously benefited by protectionism. Whether their will be a net
gain or loss in domestic employment depends on the relative strength
and weaknesses (and therefore the bargaining power) of the individual


VI. World Market and Crisis

a) Increasingly, capital confronts labor as an international entity. One
manifestation of this process is the creation of transnational
corporations (TNCs) which produce and sell commodities at many
locations globally. Some of these TNCs possess more wealth than many
countries and are often able to dictate terms to individual nations.
On the other hand, these states also have some bargaining power since
their sovereignty gives them the right to establish laws regulating the
TNCs and insisting that if TNCs want to sell commodities in their
markets, then they must also locate production facilities in that country
(or suffer prohibitive protectionist measures).

c) While capital is thus increasingly more united internationally, labor
remains divided. Many of these divisions were created by the colonial
and imperialist powers (e.g. in Fiji and Ruanda) but the antagonisms,
often born due to preferential treatment of a nationality by the colonial
power, persist.

d) While capital is more united internationally (although, important
conflicts among national states remain), workers are divided
internationally by culture, tradition, language, skills, wages,
benefits, rights, gender, nationality, race, trade union organization,
etc. Thus, what is *needed* to more effectively confront capital is
*international solidarity* and *proletarian internationalism*
(unity-in-diversity). Yet, the examples of this are not that great.
One relatively recent trend is for unions in different countries who
are employed by the same firm to have collaborative bargaining (e.g.
international autoworkers unions who belong to the International
Metalworkers Federation). Yet, given the differences in union
structure, militancy, and culture such efforts have not been very
successful to date.


OK, what did I miss?

what did I get wrong?

comments on the logical structure of the presentation chosen (i.e.
the 6-book-division)?

[Your turn, Patrick].

In solidarity, [an exhausted] Jerry