Date: Sun Oct 02 2005 - 12:53:30 EDT
From Le Monde Diplomatique. Mike Davis, author __________________________________________________________ > > > > > > CATASTROPHIC ECONOMICS > > > > The predators of New Orleans > > > > > > After the criticism of his disastrous handling the Katrina > > disaster, President George Bush promises a reconstruction > > programme of $200bn for areas destroyed by the hurricane. > > But the first and biggest beneficiaries will be businesses > > that specialise in profiting from disaster, and have already > > had lucrative contracts in Iraq; they will gentrify New > > Orleans at the expense of its poor, black citizens. > > > > By MIKE DAVIS > > > > > > THE tempest that destroyed New Orleans was conjured out of > > tropical seas and an angry atmosphere 250km offshore of the > > Bahamas. Labelled initially as "tropical depression 12" on > > 23 August, it quickly intensified into "tropical storm > > Katrina", the eleventh named storm in one of the busiest > > hurricane seasons in history. Making landfall near Miami on > > 24 August, Katrina had grown into a small hurricane, > > category one on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale, with 125 > > km/h winds that killed nine people and knocked out power to > > one million residents. > > > > Crossing over Florida to the Gulf of Mexico where it > > wandered for four days, Katrina underwent a monstrous and > > largely unexpected transformation. Siphoning vast quantities > > of energy from the Gulf's abnormally warm waters, 3=B0C above > > their usual August temperature, Katrina mushroomed into an > > awesome, top-of-the-scale, class five hurricane with 290 > > km/h winds that propelled tsunami-like storm surges nearly > > 10m in height. The journal Nature later reported that > > Katrina absorbed so much heat from the Gulf that "water > > temperatures dropped dramatically after it had passed, in > > some regions from 30=B0C to 26=B0C" (1). Horrified > > meteorologists had rarely seen a Caribbean hurricane > > replenish its power so dramatically, and researchers debated > > whether or not Katrina's explosive growth was a portent of > > global warming's impact on hurricane intensity. > > > > Although Katrina had dropped to category four, with 210-249 > > km/h winds, by the time it careened ashore in Plaquemines > > Parish, Louisiana, near the mouth of the Mississippi river > > on early 29 August, it was small consolation to the doomed > > oil ports, fishing camps and Cajun villages in its direct > > path. In Plaquemines, and again on the Gulf Coast of > > Mississippi and Alabama, it churned the bayous with > > relentless wrath, leaving behind a devastated landscape that > > looked like a watery Hiroshima. > > > > Metropolitan New Orleans, with 1.3 million inhabitants, was > > originally dead centre in Katrina's way, but the storm > > veered to the right after landfall and its eye passed 55km > > to the east of the metropolis. The Big Easy, largely under > > sea-level and bordered by the salt-water embayments known as > > Lake Pontchartrain (on the north) and Lake Borgne (on the > > east), was spared the worst of Katrina's winds but not its > > waters. > > > > Hurricane-driven storm surges from both lakes broke through > > the notoriously inadequate levees, not as high as in more > > affluent areas, which guard black-majority eastern New > > Orleans as well as adjacent white blue-collar suburbs in St > > Bernard Parish. There was no warning and the rapidly rising > > waters trapped and killed hundreds of unevacuated people in > > their bedrooms, including 34 elderly residents of a nursing > > home. Later, probably around midday, a more formidable > > floodwall gave way at the 17th Street Canal, allowing Lake > > Pontchartrain to pour into low-lying central districts. > > > > Although New Orleans's most famous tourist assets, including > > the French Quarter and the Garden District, and its most > > patrician neighbourhoods, such as Audubon Park, are built on > > high ground and survived the inundation, the rest of the > > city was flooded to its rooftops or higher, damaging or > > destroying more than 150,000 housing units. Locals promptly > > called it "Lake George" after the president who failed to > > build new levees or come to their aid after the old ones had > > burst. > > > > Inequalities of class and race > > > > Bush initially said that "the storm didn't discriminate", a > > claim he was later forced to retract: every aspect of the > > catastrophe was shaped by inequalities of class and race. > > Besides unmasking the fraudulent claims of the Department of > > Homeland Security to make Americans safer, the shock and awe > > of Katrina also exposed the devastating consequences of > > federal neglect of majority black and Latino big cities and > > their vital infrastructures. The incompetence of the Federal > > Emergency Management Agency (Fema) demonstrated the folly of > > entrusting life-and-death public mandates to clueless > > political appointees and ideological foes of "big > > government". The speed with which Washington suspended the > > prevailing wage standards of the Davis-Bacon Act (2) and > > swung open the doors of New Orleans to corporate looters > > such as Halliburton, the Shaw Group and Blackwater Security, > > already fat from the spoils of the Tigris, contrasted > > obscenely with Fema's deadly procrastination over sending > > water, food and buses to the multitudes trapped in the > > stinking hell of the Louisiana Superdome. > > > > But if New Orleans, as many bitter exiles now believe, was > > allowed to die as a result of governmental incompetence and > > neglect, blame also squarely falls on the Governor's Mansion > > in Baton Rouge, and especially on City Hall on Perdido > > Street. Mayor C Ray Nagin is a wealthy African-American > > cable television executive and a Democrat, who was elected > > in 2002 with 87% of the white vote (3). > > > > He was ultimately responsible for the safety of the > > estimated quarter of the population that was too poor or > > infirm to own a car. His stunning failure to mobilise > > resources to evacuate car-less residents and hospital > > patients, despite warning signals from the city's botched > > response to the threat of Hurricane Ivan in September 2004, > > reflected more than personal ineptitude: it was also a > > symbol of the callous attitude among the city's elites, both > > white and black, toward their poor neighbours in backswamp > > districts and rundown housing projects. Indeed, the ultimate > > revelation of Katrina was how comprehensively the promise of > > equal rights for poor African-Americans has been dishonoured > > and betrayed by every level of government. > > > > A death foretold > > > > The death of New Orleans had been forewarned; indeed no > > disaster in American history had been so accurately > > predicted in advance. Although the Homeland Security > > Secretary, Michael Chertoff, would later claim that "the > > size of the storm was beyond anything his department could > > have anticipated," this was flatly untrue. If scientists > > were surprised by Katrina's sudden burgeoning to super-storm > > dimensions, they had grim confidence in exactly what New > > Orleans could expect from the landfall of a great hurricane. > > > > Since the nasty experience of Hurricane Betsy in September > > 1965 (a category three storm that inundated many eastern > > parts of Orleans Parish that were drowned by Katrina), the > > vulnerability of the city to wind-driven storm surges has > > been intensively studied and widely publicised. In 1998, > > after a close call with Hurricane Georges, research > > increased and a sophisticated computer study by Louisiana > > State University warned of the "virtual destruction" of the > > city by a category four storm approaching from the > > southwest (4). > > > > The city's levees and stormwalls are only designed to > > withstand a category three hurricane, but even that > > threshold of protection was revealed as illusory in computer > > simulations last year by the Army Corps of Engineers. The > > continuous erosion of southern Louisiana's barrier islands > > and bayou wetlands (an estimated annual shoreline loss of > > 60-100 sq km) increases the height of surges as they arrive > > at New Orleans, while the city, along with its levees, is > > slowly sinking. As a result even a category three, if slow > > moving, would flood most of it (5). Global warming and > > sea-level rise will only make the "Big One", as folks in New > > Orleans, like their counterparts in Los Angeles, call the > > local apocalypse, even bigger. > > > > Lest politicians have difficulty understanding the > > implications of such predictions, other studies modelled the > > exact extent of flooding as well as the expected casualties > > of a direct hit. Supercomputers repeatedly cranked out the > > same horrifying numbers: 160 sq km or more of the city under > > water with 80-100,000 dead, the worst disaster in United > > States history. In the light of these studies, Fema warned > > in 2001 that a hurricane flood in New Orleans was one of the > > three mega-catastrophes most likely to strike the US in the > > near future, along with a California earthquake and a > > terrorist attack on Manhattan. > > > > Shortly afterwards, the magazine Scientific American > > published an account of the flood danger ("Drowning New > > Orleans", October 2001) which, like an award-winning series > > ("The Big One') in the local newspaper, the Times-Picayune, > > in 2002, was chillingly accurate in its warnings. Last year, > > after meteorologists predicted a strong upsurge in hurricane > > activity, federal officials carried out an elaborate > > disaster drill ("Hurricane Pam") that re-confirmed that > > casualties would be likely to be in the tens of thousands. > > > > The Bush administration's response to these frightening > > forecasts was to rebuff Louisiana's urgent requests for more > > flood protection: the crucial Coast 2050 project to revive > > protective wetlands, the culmination of a decade of research > > and negotiation, was shelved and levee appropriations, > > including the completion of defences around Lake > > Pontchartrain, were repeatedly slashed. > > > > Washington at work > > > > In part, this was a consequence of new priorities in > > Washington that squeezed the budget of the Army Corps: a > > huge tax cut for the rich, the financing of the war in Iraq, > > and the costs of "Homeland Security". Yet there was > > undoubtedly a brazen political motive as well: New Orleans > > is a black-majority, solidly Democratic city whose voters > > frequently wield the balance of power in state elections. > > Why would an administration so relentlessly focused on > > partisan warfare seek to reward this thorn in Karl Rove's > > side by authorising the $2.5bn that senior Corps officials > > estimated would be required to build a category five > > protection system around the city? (6). > > > > Indeed when the head of the Corps, a former Republican > > congressman, protested in 2002 against the way that > > flood-control projects were being short-changed, Bush > > removed him from office. Last year the administration also > > pressured Congress to cut $71m from the budget of the > > Corps's New Orleans district despite warnings of epic > > hurricane seasons close at hand. > > > > To be fair, Washington has spent a lot of money on > > Louisiana, but it has been largely on non-hurricane-related > > public works that benefit shipping interests and hardcore > > Republican districts (7). Besides underfunding coastline > > restoration and levee construction, the White House > > mindlessly vandalised Fema. Under director James Lee Witt > > (who enjoyed Cabinet rank), Fema had been the showpiece of > > the Clinton administration, winning bipartisan praise for > > its efficient dispatch of search and rescue teams and prompt > > provision of federal aid after the 1993 Mississippi River > > floods and the 1994 Los Angeles earthquake. > > > > When Republicans took over the agency in 2001, it was > > treated as enemy terrain: the new director, former Bush > > campaign manager Joe Allbaugh, decried disaster assistance > > as "an oversized entitlement programme" and urged Americans > > to rely more upon the Salvation Army and other faith-based > > groups. Allbaugh cut back many key flood and storm > > mitigation programmes, before resigning in 2003 to become a > > highly-paid consultant to firms seeking contracts in Iraq. > > (An inveterate ambulance-chaser, he recently reappeared in > > Louisiana as an insider broker for firms looking for > > lucrative reconstruction work in the wake of Katrina.) > > > > Since its absorption into the new Department of Homeland > > Security in 2003 (with the loss of its representation in the > > cabinet), Fema has been repeatedly downsized, and also > > ensnared in new layers of bureaucracy and patronage. Last > > year Fema employees wrote to Congress: "Emergency managers > > at Fema have been supplanted on the job by politically > > connected contractors and by novice employees with little > > background or knowledge" (8). > > > > A new Maginot Line > > > > A prime example was Allbaugh's successor and protege, > > Michael Brown, a Republican lawyer with no emergency > > management experience, whose previous job was representing > > the wealthy owners of Arabian horses. Under Brown, Fema > > continued its metamorphosis from an "all hazards" approach > > to a monomaniacal emphasis on terrorism. Three-quarters of > > the federal disaster preparedness grants that Fema formerly > > used to support local earthquake, storm and flood prevention > > has been diverted to counter-terrorism scenarios. The Bush > > administration has built a Maginot Line against al-Qaida > > while neglecting levees, storm walls and pumps. > > > > There was every reason for anxiety, if not panic, when the > > director of the National Hurricane Centre in Miami, Max > > Mayfield, warned Bush (still vacationing in Texas) and > > Homeland Security officials in a video-conference on 28 > > August that Katrina was poised to devastate New Orleans. Yet > > Brown, faced with the possible death of 100,000 > > locals,-exuded breathless, arrogant bravado: "We were so > > ready for this. We planned for this kind of disaster for > > many years because we've always known about New Orleans." > > For months Brown, and his boss Chertoff, had trumpeted the > > new National Response Plan that would ensure unprecedented > > coordination amongst government agencies during a major > > disaster. > > > > But as floodwaters swallowed New Orleans and its suburbs, it > > was difficult to find anyone to answer a phone, much less > > take charge of the relief operation. "A mayor in my > > district," an angry Republican congressman told the Wall > > Street Journal, "tried to get supplies for his constituents, > > who were hit directly by the hurricane. He called for help > > and was put on hold for 45 minutes. Eventually, a bureaucrat > > promised to write a memo to his supervisor" (9). > > Although state-of-the-art communications were supposedly the > > backbone of the new plan, frantic rescue workers and city > > officials were plagued by the breakdown of phone systems and > > the lack of a common bandwidth. > > > > At the same time they faced immediate shortages of the > > critical food rations, potable water, sandbags, generator > > fuel, satellite phones, portable toilets, buses, boats, and > > helicopters, Fema should have pre-positioned in New Orleans. > > Most fatefully, Chertoff inexplicably waited 24 hours after > > the city had been flooded to upgrade the disaster to an > > "incident of national significance", the legal precondition > > for moving federal response into high gear. > > > > Far more than the reluctance of the president to return to > > work, or the Vice-President, Dick Cheney, to interrupt a > > mansion-hunting trip, or the Secretary of State, Condoleezza > > Rice, to end a shoe-buying expedition in Manhattan, it was > > the dinosaur-like slowness of the brain of Homeland Security > > to register the magnitude of the disaster that doomed so > > many to die clinging to their roofs or hospital beds. > > Lathered in premature, embarrassing praise from Bush for > > their heroic exertions, Chertoff and Brown were more like > > sleepwalkers. > > > > As late as 2 September, Chertoff astonished an interviewer > > on National Public Radio by claiming that the scenes of > > death and desperation inside the Superdome, which the world > > was watching on television, were just "rumours and > > anecdotes". Brown blamed the victims, claiming that most > > deaths were the fault of "people who did not heed evacuation > > warnings", although he knew that "heeding" had nothing to do > > with the lack of an automobile or confinement in a > > wheelchair. > > > > Despite claims by the Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, > > that the tragedy had nothing to do with Iraq, the absence of > > more than a third of the Louisiana National Guard and much > > of its heavy equipment crippled rescue and relief operations > > from the outset. Fema often obstructed rather than > > facilitated relief: preventing civilian aircraft from > > evacuating hospital patients and delaying authorisations for > > out-of-state National Guard and rescue teams to enter the > > area. As an embittered representative from devastated St > > Bernard Parish told the Times-Picayune: "Canadian help > > arrived before the US Army did" (10). > > > > A conservative New Jerusalem > > > > New Orleans City Hall could have used Canadian help: the > > emergency command centre on its ninth floor was put out of > > operation early in the emergency by a shortage of diesel to > > run its backup generator. For two days Nagin and his aides > > were cut off from the outside world by the failure of both > > their landlines and cellular phones. This collapse of the > > city's command-and-control apparatus is puzzling in view of > > the $18m in federal grants that the city had spent since > > 2002 in training exercises to deal with such contingencies. > > Even more mysterious was the relationship between Nagin and > > his state and federal counterparts. As the mayor later > > summarised it, the city's disaster plan was: "Get people to > > higher ground and have the feds and the state -airlift > > supplies to them." Yet Nagin's Director of Homeland > > Security, Colonel Terry Ebbert, astonished journalists with > > the admission that "he never spoke with Fema about the state > > disaster blueprint" (11). > > > > Nagin later ranted with justification about Fema's failure > > to pre-position supplies or to rush buses and medical > > supplies promptly to the Superdome. But evacuation planning > > was, above all, a city responsibility; and earlier planning > > exercises and surveys had shown that at least a fifth of the > > population would be unable to leave without > > assistance (12). In September 2004 Nagin had been > > roundly criticised for making no effort to evacuate poor > > residents as their better-off neighbours drove off before > > category-three Hurricane Ivan (which fortunately veered away > > from the city at the last moment). > > > > In response, the city produced, but never distributed, > > 30,000 videos targeted at poor neighbourhoods that urged > > residents "Don't wait for the city, don't wait for the > > state, don't wait for the Red Cross, leave." In the absence > > of official planning to provide buses or better, trains, > > such advice seem to imply that poor people had to start > > walking. But when, after the breakdown of sanitation and > > order in the Superdome, hundreds did attempt to escape the > > city by walking across a bridge into the white suburb of > > Gretna, they were turned back by panicky local police who > > fired over their heads. > > > > It is inevitable that many of those left behind in drowning > > neighbourhoods will interpret City Hall's unconscionable > > negligence in the context of the bitter economic and racial > > schisms that have long made New Orleans the most tragic city > > in the US. It is no secret that its business elites and > > their allies in City Hall would like to push the poorest > > segment of the population, blamed for high crime rates, out > > of the city. Historic public-housing projects have been > > razed to make room for upper-income townhouses and a > > Wal-Mart. In other housing projects, residents are routinely > > evicted for offences as trivial as their children's curfew > > violations. The ultimate goal seems to be a tourist > > theme-park New Orleans, Las Vegas on the Mississippi, with > > chronic poverty hidden away in bayous, trailer parks and > > prisons outside the city limits. > > > > Not surprisingly, some advocates of a whiter, safer city see > > a divine plan in Katrina. "We finally cleaned up public > > housing in New Orleans," a leading Louisiana Republican > > confined to Washington lobbyists. "We couldn't do it, but > > God did" (13). Nagin boasted of his empty streets and > > ruined neighbourhoods: "This city is for the first time free > > of drugs and violence, and we intend to keep it that way." > > > > A partial ethnic cleansing of New Orleans will be a fait > > accompli without massive local and federal efforts to > > provide affordable housing for tens of thousands of poor > > renters now dispersed across the country in refugee > > shelters. Already there is intense debate about transforming > > some of poorest, low-lying neighbourhoods, such the Lower > > Ninth Ward (flooded again by Hurricane Rita), into water > > retention ponds to protect wealthier parts. As the Wall > > Street Journal has rightly emphasised, "That would mean > > preventing some of New Orleans's poorest residents from ever > > returning to their neighbourhoods" (14). > > > > Epic political dogfight > > > > As everyone recognises, the rebuilding of New Orleans and > > the rest of afflicted Gulf region will be an epic political > > dogfight. Already Nagin has staked out the claims of the > > local gentrifying class by announcing that he will appoint a > > 16-member reconstruction commission evenly split between > > whites and blacks, although the city is more than 75% > > African-American. Its "white-flight" suburbs (social > > springboards for neo-Nazi David Duke's frightening electoral > > successes in the early 1990s) will fiercely lobby for their > > cause, while Mississippi's powerful Republican establishment > > has already warned that it will not play second fiddle to > > Big Easy Democrats. In this inevitable clash of interest > > groups, it is unlikely that the city's traditional black > > neighbourhoods, the true hearths of its joyous sensibility > > and jazz culture, will be able to exercise much clout. > > > > The Bush administration hopes to find its own resurrection > > in a combination of rampant fiscal Keynesianism and > > fundamentalist social engineering. Katrina's immediate > > impact on the Potomac was such a steep fall in Bush's > > popularity, and, collaterally, in approval for the US > > occupation of Iraq, that Republican hegemony seemed suddenly > > under threat. For the first time since the Los Angeles riots > > of 1992, "old Democrat" issues such as poverty, racial > > injustice and public investment temporarily commanded public > > discourse, and the Wall Street Journal warned that > > Republicans had "to get back on the political and > > intellectual offensive" before liberals like Ted Kennedy > > could revive New Deal nostrums, such as a massive federal > > agency for flood -control and shoreline restoration along > > the Gulf coast (15). > > > > The Heritage Foundation hosted meetings late into the night > > at which conservative ideologues, congressional cadres and > > the ghosts of Republicans past (such as Edwin Meese, Ronald > > Reagan's former Attorney General) hashed a strategy to > > rescue Bush from the toxic aftermath of Fema's disgrace. New > > Orleans's floodlit but empty Jackson Square was the eerie > > backdrop for Bush's 15 September speech on reconstruction. > > It was an extraordinary performance. He sunnily reassured > > two million victims that the White House would pick up most > > of the tab for the estimated $200bn flood damage: deficit > > spending on a scale that would have given Keynes vertigo. > > (It has not deterred him from proposing another huge tax cut > > for the super-rich.) > > > > Bush wooed his political base with a dream list of > > long-sought-after conservative social reforms: school and > > housing vouchers (16), a central role for churches, an > > urban homestead lottery (17), extensive tax breaks to > > businesses, the creation of a Gulf Opportunity > > Zone (18), and the suspension of annoying government > > regulations (in the fine print these include prevailing > > wages in construction and environmental regulations on > > offshore drilling). > > > > For connoisseurs of Bush-speak, the speech was a moment of > > exquisite deja vu. Had not similar promises been made on the > > banks of the Euphrates? As Paul Krugman cruelly pointed out, > > the White House, having tried and failed to turn Iraq "into > > a laboratory for conservative economic policies", would now > > experiment on traumatised inhabitants of Biloxi and the > > Ninth Ward (19). Congressman Mike Pence, a leader of the > > powerful Republican Study Group which helped draft Bush's > > reconstruction agenda, emphasised that Republicans would > > turn the rubble into a capitalist utopia: "We want to turn > > the Gulf Coast into a magnet for free enterprise. The last > > thing we want is a federal city where New Orleans once > > was" (20). > > > > Symptomatically, the Army Corps in New Orleans is now led by > > the official who formerly oversaw contracts in > > Iraq (21). The Lower Ninth Ward may never exist again, > > but already the barroom and strip-joint owners in the French > > Quarter are relishing the fat days ahead, as the Halliburton > > workers, Blackwater mercenaries, and Bechtel engineers leave > > their federal paychecks behind on Bourbon Street. As they > > say in Cajun, -- and no doubt now in the White House too -- > > "laissez les bons temps rouler!" > > > > > > > > * Mike Davis is the author of 'The Monster at Our Door. The > > Global Threat of Avian Flu' (New Press, New York, 2005), > > 'Dead cities, and other tales' (New Press, 2002), 'Late > > Victorian holocausts: El Nino famines and the making of the > > third world' (Verso, London and New York, 2001), 'Ecology of > > fear: Los Angeles and the imagination of disaster' (Picador, > > London, 2000) and many other works. > > > > > > Original text in English > > > > (1) Quirin Schiermeier, "The Power of Katrina," Nature, > > no 437, London, 8 September 2005. > > > > (2) Editorial note: legislation dating from the New Deal > > obliging public employers to respect the minimum local wage. > > > > (3) Though Louisiana voted for Bush in 2004 (56.7%), New > > Orleans is traditionally Democrat. > > > > (4) Study by engineering professor Joseph Suhayda > > described in Richard Campanella, Time and Place in New > > Orleans, Gretna, Los Angeles, 2002. > > > > (5) John Travis, "Scientists' Fears Come True as > > Hurricane Floods New Orleans", Science, no 309, New York, 9 > > September 2005. > > > > (6) Andrew Revkin and Christopher Drew, "Intricate Flood > > Protection Long a Focus of Dispute," New York Times, 1 > > September 2005. > > > > (7) "Katrina's Message on the Corps," New York Times, 13 > > September 2005. > > > > (8) "Top Fema Jobs: No Experience Required," Los Angeles > > Times, 9 September 2005. > > > > (9) Congressman Bobby Jindal, "When Red Tape Trumped > > Common Sense," Wall Street Journal, 8 September 2005. > > > > (10) Melinda Deslatte, "St Bernard Parish residents > > overflow the Capital," Times-Picayune, 12 September 2005. > > > > (11) New York Times, 7 and 11 September 2005. > > > > (12) Tony Reichhardt, Erika Check and Emma Morris, > > "After the flood," Nature, no 437, 8 September 2005. > > > > (13) Congressman Richard Baker (Baton Rouge) quoted in > > "Washington Wire," Wall Street Journal, 9 September 2005. > > > > (14) "As Gulf Prepares to Rebuild, Tensions Mount Over > > Control," Wall Street Journal, 15 September 2005. > > > > (15) "Hurricane Bush," Wall Street Journal, 15 September > > 2005. > > > > (16) Editor's note: rental vouchers were issued, backed > > by Congress-approved funds, to 20,000 homeless after the > > 1994 Los Angeles earthquake to pay for rent anywhere in the > > state. > > > > (17) Editor's note: a plan to distribute federal land to > > those who would pledge to erect a house on it and could > > afford to do so. It is estimated that this would provide > > about 4,000 sites for 250,000 displaced people, 125,000 of > > whom were renting. > > > > (18) Editor's note: a zone in which relief is related to > > private financial initiatives. > > > > (19) "Not the New Deal," New York Times, 16 September > > 2005. > > > > (20) John Wilke and Brody Mullins, "After Katrina, > > Republicans Back a Sea of Conservative Ideas," Wall Street > > Journal, 15 September 2005. > > > > (21) Editorial, "Mr Bush in New Orleans," New York > > Times, 16 September 2005.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Mon Oct 03 2005 - 00:00:01 EDT