[OPE-L:6063] rentier state

From: Rakesh Bhandari (rakeshb@stanford.edu)
Date: Sat Oct 13 2001 - 15:07:10 EDT

Okruhlik, Gwenn  Rentier wealth, unruly law, and the rise of opposition: the 
political economy of oil states. Comparative Politics v31, n3 (April, 1999):295 
(2 pages).
  Abstract: Theories of rentierism argue that oil states are not politically 
accountable and can   effectively buy off potential opposition because they do 
not depend upon the populace for taxation.                       
   However, this framework is subject to economic determinism since such 
states' wealth has been a catalyst for opposition and has served as a means to 
placate dissent.                     
    Development is shaped by political choices on how to spend oil revenues. 
This is best illusrated by Saudi Arabia, wherein opposition was fostered by the 
state via the deployment of rent in instances concerning both religion and 


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