I appreciated Paul Zarembka's response in OPE-L 4912. I agree with him that Jerry "claimed too much" in OPE-L 4911, and that I was not engaged in a "diatribe" against Fred. I also appreciated Jerry's tennis analogy: "If this were a tennis match would we therefore say 'game, set and match to Fred'? This is not an unreasonable conclusion, after all, since Andrew has -- in effect -- resigned from the tournament." The reason Jerry wants to declare "game, set and match to Fred" is that I didn't return Fred's serve (i.e., provide an alternative interpretation of the textual evidence). But, Jerry, only one way of winning a point in tennis involves returning the serve. There are other ways. If the server foot-faulted on his second serve, you automatically win the point. You do not have to return service. There is no purpose in doing so, since you've already won. Fred foot-faulted on his second serve. I automatically won the point. I do not have to return service. There is no purpose in doing so, since I've already won. Tennis is a game. Games have rules. Play must proceed according to the rules of the game. If it doesn't, it is not tennis; it is just hitting the ball back and forth across the net. To pursue your analogy a bit further, scholarly discourse is likewise a game. It has its own rules. Dialogue must proceed according to the rules of the game. If it doesn't, it is not scholarly discourse; it is just lobbing opinions back and forth across the Net. That is why the battles of quotations of the sort into which you want me to descend never get anywhere, never resolve anything. They proceed without regard to rules and without agreed-upon methods of scoring. I am perfectly capable of returning Fred's serve (providing an alternative interpretation of his quotations). But I want to play tennis, not just hit the ball back and forth across the net. For us to play tennis, we must agree on the rules and the methods of scoring before play commences. So I have asked Fred about his rules of the game. Under what conditions would he be willing to concede that he has lost the match? He has replied that he would concede this if his return of my shot was no good (new evidence contradicts this interpretation). What is no good is this answer. In order to determine whether his return is good or not, he must provide some *genuine* rules. He must tell us under what conditions would he be willing to concede that his return was in fact no good. In the absence of such rules, he can always win the point by scoring his foot-faults, shots beyond the baseline, shots into the net, etc. as "good." Unfortunately, he has not told us under what conditions would he be willing to concede that his return was no good. Let me make clear that I have indeed dealt with Fred's evidence. I haven't provided an alternative interpretation, but I have dealt with his evidence. I wrote, twice, that he "invented" the second profit rate. In other words, he has no direct textual evidence for it. Where does Marx refer to two different profit rates? Nowhere. Fred's conclusion that there is a second profit rate is therefore NOT a direct inference from evidence. It is rather a deduction based on the following *premises*: 1. If Marx was referring to the same profit rate in Ch. 6 and Part II, and if Marx didn't contradict himself, then Fred's interpretation of the Part II evidence is wrong. 2. Marx didn't contradict himself. 3. Fred's interpretation of the Part II evidence is not wrong. Ergo, 4. Marx was not referring to the same profit rate in Ch. 6 and Part II. Because, precisely because, his conclusion is a deductive one, one based on premises rather than evidence, the way I challenged his conclusion was appropriate. I couldn't challenge his evidence because he doesn't have any. He has a deduction. So I challenged his third premise, the dogmatic presupposition that his interpretation of the Part II evidence is not wrong. Throw out that presupposition and the "second profit rate" argument falls to the ground. Andrew ("Drewk") Kliman Dept. of Social Sciences Pace University Pleasantville, NY 10570 USA phone: (914) 773-3968 fax: (914) 773-3951 Home: 60 W. 76th St. #4E New York, NY 10023 USA "The practice of philosophy is itself theoretical. It is the critique that measures the individual existence by the essence, the particular reality by the Idea."
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Thu Mar 01 2001 - 14:01:38 EST