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> Banaji relates the 'ground' of dialectical logic to essence logic: Capital
> is 'essence' in so far as it is value in process, or the form of value;
> i.e. 'value is the dominant subject' (p.39). But value is likewise the
> 'essence' of the commodity in so far as the commodity is the posited form
> of value, and in this sense grounds the whole movement [btw, I think the
> basis for Banaji's distinction between commodity and commodity form, lies
> in his distinction between the commodity as starting point and the
> commodity as ground - but please correct me if you think I'm wrong].
Thank-you for your illuminating exposition Nicky. I'm not sure about
the distinction to which you refer. Doesn't Banaji seem to imply that
the commodity as (analytic) point of departure can, *for that reason*,
be considered as the 'ground' for his investigation? I thought that it
(the commodity) could be considered as 'ground' only because it was
the (analytic) point of departure for comprehending capital.
Or maybe you are referring to the fact that Banaji can only reveal the
true nature of the beginning once he has gone through most of his
exposition? For only then can the significance (the abstract and
universal nature) of the commodity - the analytic point of departure -
Now, I'm getting a headache!
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